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Conflict in Roles: 
Lying to the In-Group 
Versus the Out- 
Group in Negotiations
Katherina Glac1, Danielle E. Warren2, 
and Chao C. Chen2
Abstract
This empirical study examines how group membership affects the likelihood 
of lies occurring in a two-person negotiation setting involving an experi-
mental design with a repeated ultimatum bargaining. To better understand 
the reasoning of the negotiator in in-group and out-group bargaining exer-
cises, the authors also examined perceptions of fairness in relation to offers 
for the in-group and out-group. The authors find that when negotiating, 
individuals tell lies of greater magnitude to out-group members than to in-
group members. In both situations, the magnitude of the initial lie predicts 
the likelihood that a concealment lie (i.e., another lie to conceal the initial 
lie) will be told. The study also finds that in negotiations with in-group 
members, the relationship between the initial lie and the concealment lie is 
moderated by the negotiator’s perceptions of unfair treatment toward the 
in-group bargaining partner. The authors assert that concealment lies with 
in-group members allow the individual to appear to maintain both the roles 
of a self-interested negotiator and a fair group member. The authors tested 
three hypotheses using a natural group of 42 undergraduate students who 
belonged to a sports team at a large Northeastern university. Implications 
for stakeholder research are addressed.
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The negotiations literature provides rich empirical research on individual and 
situational variables that predict the likelihood of lying in bargaining situa-
tions. This literature typically focuses on the self-interested economic moti-
vations of the negotiators. Several studies provide evidence that the strength 
of incentives, information asymmetry, and greed increase the likelihood that 
individuals will lie in a negotiation (Boles, Croson, & Murnighan, 2000; 
Tenbrunsel, 1998). Others argue that past research focuses too heavily on the 
economically motivated actor and overlooks the importance of social factors 
(Robert & Carnevale, 1997). For instance, Greenhalgh (1995) asserts that the 
current economics-oriented paradigm, which views the individual as a util-
ity-optimizing egoist, derives from an overly narrow view of the relationship 
between the actors in a transaction. In order to gain a better understanding of 
negotiation in different contexts, Greenhalgh suggests considering dimen-
sions beyond “competitive self-interest, economic exchange, and power” 
(p. 264) in the relationship between negotiating parties.
To understand the social factors that predict lying in negotiations, the 
authors examined the literature on social exchange, which addresses how dif-
ferent transactions invoke distinct allocation goals and rules for the distribu-
tion of resources (Blau, 1964; Fiske, 1992). For instance, when a situation 
points toward an economic exchange, then resources tend to be distributed 
among individuals based on their input, effort, or performance (equity alloca-
tion). In contrast, in interactions that contain an exchange of socioemotional 
benefits, such as interactions with family or members of one’s community, 
resources tend to be distributed equally among all group members (equality 
allocation) or based on how much someone needs (need allocation; Fiske, 
1992). Following work by Carles and Carver (1979), Parks et al. (1996) con-
firm the influence of the orientation of the transaction as well as indicate that 
the type of relationship one has with others influences the choice of alloca-
tion rules. In choosing an allocation rule, friendship is a powerful influence, 
since the refusal to share with others in such a relationship is seen as a threat 
to the future quality of the relationship—almost comparable to a sanction that 
is associated with norm transgression. Although this research does not spe-
cifically address lying, it highlights the way in which different transactions 
are associated with distinct economic and noneconomic allocation rules. It 
also suggests that affiliation of individuals in a transaction will affect the 
choice of allocation rules and perceptions of fairness.
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Even though the research that suggests allocation rules change based on 
the nature of the exchange, most of the past findings regarding lying in nego-
tiations posit an adversarial relationship where the negotiating partners do 
not share group membership.1 Interaction with group members, according to 
social exchange theory, should influence allocation rules and what is per-
ceived as fair. This study compares how individuals negotiate with someone 
from their own group (a sports team) as opposed to someone from an out-
group (a rival sports team) in order to see how group membership affects the 
extent and likelihood of lying in a negotiation setting. To understand better 
the reasoning of the negotiator in in-group and out-group bargaining exer-
cises, the authors also examined perceptions of fairness in relation to negotia-
tion offers for the in-group and the out-group.
Lying Versus Bluffing
A growing literature exists on lying in organizational behavior. Many studies 
examine the individual and situational factors that predict lies, approaches 
for recovering from lies, and methods for detecting lies (Grover, 1993; 
Grover & Hui, 1994; Lewicki, 1983; Lewicki & Robinson, 1998; Scott & 
Jehn, 1999, 2003). The terminology and definitions of lying vary in the 
literature—lying is often referred to as deception, misrepresentation, or dis-
honesty. Whereas some scholars offer nuanced interpretations of these con-
structs (see Scott & Jehn, 2003), others use the terms interchangeably (see 
Grover, 1993). In this study, the authors use the term “lie” and adopt the 
most common definition of a lie, which assumes that the act is intentional 
and voluntary and involves the offering of incorrect information (Bok, 1989; 
Grover, 1993; Lewicki, 1983; Scott & Jehn, 1999).
Some differences exist between the social science and philosophical anal-
yses of lying in negotiations. This study focuses on the misstating of one’s 
bargaining position, which some refer to as bluffing, rather than lying. 
Although the moral legitimacy of lying in negotiations is debated in the lit-
erature (see, for example, Alhoff, 2003; Carr, 1968; Carson, 1993; Varelius, 
2006), there is less disagreement about the pervasive nature of different 
forms of lying as part of the negotiation process and this sheds some light on 
the moral implications.
Carr (1968), for example, has argued that bluffing is actually part of the 
business “game” and a mark of a good negotiator, and Cramton and Dees 
(1993) see bluffing, exaggeration, and misrepresentation as tactics that 
enhance negotiation success. Carson (1993, 2005) does not make a compari-
son with poker games as Carr does, but he also uses the common occurrence 
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of bluffing in negotiations as a starting point to argue that bluffing is not a 
form of lying and might be justified.
Alhoff, on the other hand, does not use the rules of the negotiation “game” 
as a basis for his moral evaluation of bluffing due to criticism of the nature of 
this analogy (Koehn, 1997). Invoking the concept of role-differentiated 
morality, Alhoff argues that bluffing is part of the negotiator role and thus is 
permissible and even required because “without bluffing, the idea of negotia-
tions itself almost (though not quite) becomes incoherent” (Alhoff, 2003, 
p. 287) His statement is an echo of a claim White (1980) made almost 
25 years ago: “To conceal one’s true position, to mislead an opponent about 
one’s true settling point is the essence of negotiation” (p. 928).
The common assumption of lying about one’s position as integral and 
acceptable parts of negotiating has also been empirically tested. Anton’s 
study of MBA students and clergymen found that misstating one’s position 
was generally considered acceptable (Anton, 1990). Subsequently, Lewicki 
and Robinson (1998) also surveyed business students and achieved similar 
results showing that, on average, misrepresenting one’s position was deemed 
very acceptable and was a tactic that survey participants would be quite likely 
to use in a negotiation setting.
Although this study does not examine the moral justification of lying (or 
bluffing), it is useful to draw on normative debates regarding lying in order to 
situate this study among discussions of differentiated morality. Lying in 
negotiations might not be considered as moral by everyone; it is nevertheless 
common, is often expected as part of the negotiation situation, and is a char-
acteristic of the negotiator role. In short, it is common for individuals to lie in 
negotiations. The purpose of this study is to test whether or not this holds true 
for transactions with in-group members where norms and expectations 
regarding treatment and favoritism may conflict with self-interest.
Model and Hypotheses
As discussed above, this study aims at increasing scholarly understanding of 
lying in negotiations. In particular, the authors are interested in examining 
how different social settings affect the likelihood that individuals will use 
lies during negotiations. Since differences in social settings change the 
expectations that negotiators have about their role and behavior, this study 
will also examine how perceptions of fairness of the negotiation affect the 
occurrence of lying. Figure 1 illustrates the relationships between the vari-
ables examined in this study and the hypotheses that will be developed and 
tested below.
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Influence of Group Membership on Lying Behavior
According to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1985), individuals hold 
positive biases (e.g., favoritism) toward members of their in-group and nega-
tive biases (e.g., discrimination) toward members of the out-group (Chen, 
Brockner, & Katz, 1998). Past research suggests individuals negotiating with 
in-group members exhibit more cooperation and generosity and distribute 
resources more favorably than when negotiating with out-group members 
(Gomez, Kirkman, & Shapiro, 2000; Robert & Carnevale, 1997). Individuals 
may also refrain from opportunistic behaviors with in-group members to avoid 
nonmonetary penalties such as loss of credibility and loss of social ties with the 
in-group (Brass, Butterfield, & Skaggs, 1998). There also are other studies that 
do not specifically focus on lying but still theorize that a relationship exists 
between a person’s group membership and opportunism (Chen, Peng, & 
Saparito, 2002; Ghoshal & Moran, 1990; Insko, Schopler, Hoyle, Dardis, & 
Graetz, 1990).
Literature on social exchange also lends support to the significance of 
group membership in transactions. When individuals negotiate with mem-
bers of their own group, research suggests that group membership will acti-
vate the psychological mode of communal sharing and the perception of 
friendship as well as emphasize the “sense of community”—all of which 
point toward the salience of the equality or need allocation rules (Fiske, 1992; 
Parks et al., 1996). Conversely, negotiations with out-group members have 
more characteristics of an economic exchange, which activates psychological 
modes of market pricing or equity allocation rules. Consequently, competi-
tive reasoning associated with negotiations should lead to more lying in 
Membership of
Negotiation Partner
(ingroup/outgroup)
Likelihood of
Concealment Lie
Extent of
Initial Lie
Perceived Fairness of
Offer
H1: outgroup >
ingroup
H3: -
H2: +
Figure 1. Model and hypotheses tested in the study.
Note: Extent of initial lie indicates the difference between how much money 
negotiators claimed they had for distribution and how much they actually had.
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negotiations with out-group members than with in-group members, which 
should reflect communal sharing reasoning.
Hypothesis 1: Individuals will tell lies of larger magnitude when trans-
acting with members of the out-group than with members of the 
in-group.
Influence of the Magnitude of Initial  
Lie on the Likelihood of a Subsequent Concealment Lie
The literature on escalating commitment and rationalization, though not 
specifically focusing on lying behavior, suggests that those who tell a first lie 
are likely to tell a second. In his seminal work, Staw (1976) found that indi-
viduals followed one bad behavior with another bad behavior in order to 
justify the initial behavior. Beauvois, Joule, and Brunetti (1993) shed more 
light on the reasons for the escalation of commitment. Their experimental 
studies suggest that individuals who do not have time to rationalize their 
initial behavior in a cognitive way, perhaps by adjusting their attitudes, 
engage in additional problematic behaviors, “in order to rationalize a previ-
ous problematic behavior (i.e. to make the behavior less problematic)” 
(Beauvois et al., 1993, p. 2)
The authors hypothesize that this general process also holds true for tell-
ing lies. Given what is known about fairness, the initial lie in general may be 
viewed as a bad course of action. Furthermore, if the magnitude of the initial 
lie is large, it will be more likely that participants will perceive the lie as a bad 
course of action. Thus, if participants are given the opportunity to lie more 
than once in a negotiation, the magnitude of the initial lie should predict the 
likelihood of a secondary concealment lie.
Hypothesis 2: The magnitude of the initial lie affects the likelihood of 
a concealment lie.
Influence of Perceptions of Fairness on the Relationship 
Between the Initial Lie and the Concealment Lie
Lying in negotiations has been conceptualized as a tactic for some time. 
Individuals will be more likely to lie if it helps them to achieve the outcomes 
they desire without major harm to their relationship with the negotiation 
partner (Lewicki, 1983). However, Grover argues that in situations that go 
beyond a simple dyadic relationship, the self-interest model of lying is not 
adequate because it does not consider prosocial theories of behavior. He 
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proposes a more extensive model of lying that considers “the intrapersonal 
conflict of a performance expectation” (Grover, 1993, p.481) in addition to 
self-interest. This model explains lying as a mechanism to reduce dissonance 
and individual distress that a liar might experience in situations involving 
role conflicts. That is, in situations where the roles an individual is expected 
to conform to are in conflict, “one may behave according to one role and 
report, state, or create the illusion that one has behaved in accordance with 
the other role” (Grover, 1993, p. 482). The accuracy of the model, and par-
ticularly the interaction between self-interest and role-demands, has been 
confirmed by empirical work. Grover and Hui find that “in fact both self-
interest and role conflict influenced lying behavior and that people were 
most likely to lie when both role conflict and some reward for lying were 
present” (Grover & Hui, 1994, p. 301).
This work is particularly appropriate for understanding the difference in 
the extent of lying in negotiations with in-group members, as compared to 
negotiations with out-group members, since the role expectations differ. In 
both situations, self-interest should be a major factor in determining lying 
behavior. However, in a setting where individuals negotiate with members of 
their own group, an additional conflict between the self-interested role of a 
negotiator and the demands of a role as a group member should be present. 
Group member expectations might require prosocial and community-oriented 
behavior inconsistent with the self-interested tendencies of negotiator roles.
Extending the work by Grover (1993) and Grover and Hui (1994) to such 
scenarios, the authors suggest that individuals may experience role conflict 
and distress when they negotiate with members of their own group, and that 
lying may serve to alleviate this distress by creating the illusion that both role 
expectations are met. The source of this distress is routed in a sense of fair-
ness. Research on organizational justice, and in particular, distributional jus-
tice, suggests fairness in allocations is particularly important and that 
attributes of the social interaction play a role in what an individual might 
perceive as a fair distribution and which allocation rule will be chosen or 
activated (Blau, 1964; Deutsch, 1975; Larwood, Kavanagh, & Levine, 1978; 
Leventhal, 1980; Sheppard, Lewicki, & Minton, 1992). This research sug-
gests individuals select the fairness model that fits the task at hand and the 
norm that is portrayed.
Strong support exists for the relationship between fairness perceptions and 
allocations in negotiations, but this research typically does not focus on lying. 
Pillutla and Murnighan (1995) found that appearing fair for exploitative rea-
sons was important in certain ultimatum bargaining circumstances such as 
those involving independent third-party judgments (bargaining partner 
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perceptions were less of a concern). Actually behaving fairly, however, was 
neither a concern nor common in their study. These behaviors and percep-
tions only occurred in experiments with individuals who were strangers, 
making the conditions more akin to out-group conditions in which commu-
nity allocation rules are less important. By adding the dimension of group 
membership, it is expected that negotiators will be concerned with fairness 
when negotiating with the in-group.
In short, allocation rules should affect reasoning such that those who tell a 
concealment lie to in-group members do so because they feel they have 
treated the in-group bargaining partner unfairly. An individual who negoti-
ates with an out-group member lacks concern about community norms or 
friendship norms; thus, concealment lies occur in negotiations with out-group 
members because they improve the likelihood that the economic gain will 
occur rather than because of concerns about fairness.
Hypothesis 3: The relationship between an initial lie told to the in-
group and a concealment lie is moderated by a sense of fairness. The 
less the offer is perceived as fair, the more likely a concealment lie 
is told. Conversely, the more the offer is perceived as fair the less 
likely a concealment lie is told.
Study Design
Negotiation. An experimental design with a repeated ultimatum bargaining 
game adapted from Boles et al. (2000)2 was used to create the negotiation 
setting for this study. Generally an ultimatum bargaining game consists of 
two stages. In the first stage, one party (the proposer) makes an offer to the 
other party (the responder) about how to distribute a certain amount of money 
(the pie). In the second stage, the responder evaluates the offer and decides to 
accept or reject it. If the offer is rejected, neither the proposer nor the 
responder receives any money. If the offer is accepted, the proposer and 
responder receive their share of the pie as the proposer had suggested in his 
or her offer.
For this study, participants were told that they were negotiating first with 
a member from their own sports team (in-group condition) and subsequently 
with a member from a sports team from another university (out-group condi-
tion). In order to eliminate any variability due to the interaction with a spe-
cific individual, the actual negotiation occurred only in the proposal portion 
of the traditional two-stage bargaining game. Thus, only one side of the nego-
tiation actually took place and all individuals played the part of the proposer. 
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No individuals from the other sports team were present, though this was not 
revealed to the participants. The proposer knew that the responder was aware 
of the pie size range but was unaware of the exact size of the pie. The struc-
ture of this negotiation allowed the proposer to lie about the pie size.
Participants. Study participants were 42 undergraduate students who 
belonged to a sports team at a large Northeastern university. The sample 
included 21 men and 21 women, and the average age of participants was 
20 years. The benefit of using a sports team for the experiment was that the 
group occurred naturally, a circumstance strengthening the external validity 
of the study. Although this study group still consists of undergraduate stu-
dents, and is subject to that criticism or limitation, the natural occurrence of 
the group at least moves the simulation setting outside the classroom. Many 
negotiation simulation studies have occurred within the classroom.
Procedure. The participants were divided into two groups of approximately 
equal size. The two groups were seated in separate rooms where they were 
given identical verbal instructions and experimental materials by the experi-
menters. They were instructed to refrain from talking with other participants 
and were also told when to open the envelopes with experimental materials 
each participant received.
After initial instructions had been given, the experimenter instructed that 
the participants open the envelope that contained the explanation of the nego-
tiation, an offer sheet on which the participants indicated their offer to the 
responder and their pie size, and two small envelopes. The offer sheet col-
lected information used to determine the magnitude of the initial lie as well 
as the occurrence of the concealment lie (see description of measures below). 
The first small envelope contained six individual dollar bills that constituted 
the pie, and an empty envelope, marked with “to my teammate,” in which the 
amount offered to the responder was to be placed together with the offer 
sheet. The experimenter read the instructions out loud. Participants then 
made their offer to their teammates, distributed the money and placed the 
offer sheet in the envelope marked “to my teammate,” sealed it, and handed 
it to the experimenter.
In the second round of negotiations, the experimenter told the participants that 
they would now negotiate with a member of a sports team from another large 
Northeastern university (though no participants from the other sports team were 
actually present). The participants then opened a second envelope, whose con-
tents were identical to the first, except that both the small envelopes and the offer 
sheet were addressed to “the XXX team member” (XXX indicates the name of 
the university). Again, the experimenter read the instructions out loud, gave par-
ticipants time to make their offer, and then collected the offer envelopes.
Glac et al. 449
After the two rounds of negotiations, a questionnaire that assessed under-
standing of the negotiation, perceptions of fairness, and demographic vari-
ables was administered. Everyone was debriefed after the experiment was 
completed.
Measures
Extent of initial lie. The offer sheet requested information about the offer 
size and the pie size. If a lie occurred, the pie size indicated on the offer sheet 
did not match the actual pie size, which was uniformly US$6. By calculating 
the difference between actual and reported pie size, a numerical variable for 
the extent of the initial lie was created, with 0 indicating no lying and 4 indi-
cating the maximum extent of the initial lie (the lowest pie size the proposers 
can claim to have received is US$2, since the pie size range revealed to the 
responder was between US$2 and US$10).
Occurrence of concealment lie. Participants were able to choose one of three 
reasons to persuade their negotiation partner to accept the offer. The three 
reasons were (a) I offered you more than I kept for myself, (2) you and I split 
the money equally, and (3) you should agree to any amount because some-
thing is better than nothing, which is what we both receive if you do not 
accept my offer. These reasons were drawn and adapted from the literature on 
social exchange, which discusses allocation rules that are grounded in com-
munal (equal split or more for you), and competitive (something better than 
nothing) reasoning (Carles & Carver, 1979; Fiske, 1992).
From these reasons, a dichotomous variable was constructed that indicates 
whether the individual lied in the logic provided for the offer, that is, whether 
a concealment lie occurred. The variable was constructed by comparing the 
reason given for the offer with the actual offer. The reason given was consid-
ered a concealment lie if either the claim was that the pie was split equally, 
but the offer was less than US$3 (the actual pie size was US$6) or if the claim 
was that the individual offered more than what was kept for self, but the offer 
was less than US$4. If the third reason was chosen (something is better than 
nothing), then no concealment lie occurred.
Perception of fairness. To measure the degree to which the study participant 
viewed a particular offering as fair toward his or her negotiation partner, the 
authors included a question that asked participants to rate the degree to which 
they agreed (on a 7-point scale) with the following statement, “My offer to 
my teammate was fair” or, for negotiations with the out-group, “My offer to 
the XXX team member was fair.” Table 1 provides an overview of the vari-
ables used in the study, and Table 2 provides descriptive statistics.
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Results
In analyzing the experiment results, the authors first examined the differ-
ences in the extent of the initial lies between the two negotiation situations 
using a paired-sample t test to compare the means in the two conditions. 
Table 1. Variables Used in the Study.
Variable Description Values
Magnitude of initial lie A difference score representing 
the difference between what 
the proposer reports the size 
of the pie is and the actual size 
of the pie.
0, 1, 2, 3, 4 (0 = no lie,  
4 = maximum 
magnitude of lie)
Occurrence of 
concealment lie
A concealment lie occurs when 
a proposer gives a false reason 
for why the responder should 
accept the proposer’s offer.
0 = no concealment lie,  
1 = concealment lie
Perceived fairness of 
offer
The degree to which proposer 
thinks a fair offer has been 
made, as measured on a 7-point 
Likert-type scale.
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
(1 = strongly disagree 
that offer was fair to 
7 = strongly agree that 
offer was fair)
Table 2. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations.
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5
1  Magnitude of initial lie to 
in-group
0.83 1.53  
2  Magnitude of initial lie to 
out-group
1.45 1.70 .66***  
3  Occurrence of 
concealment lie to 
in-group
0.31 0.47 .45** .20  
4  Occurrence of 
concealment lie to out-
group
0.36 0.48 .07 .15 –.59***  
5  Perceived fairness of offer 
to in-group
5.38 2.06 –.49** –.51*** –.26 –.40**  
6  Perceived fairness of offer 
to out-group
4.33 2.44 –.21 –.41** –.51*** –.56*** .53***
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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Hypothesis 1 predicts that individuals exhibit larger initial lies when negoti-
ating with members of an out-group than when negotiating with members of 
an in-group. Supporting this hypothesis, the average initial lie for individuals 
negotiating with members of an out-group, US$1.45, was significantly 
higher than the average initial lie for individuals negotiating with members 
of their own group, US$0.833, t(41, 42) = –2.428, p < .020.
The authors next investigated the relationship between the initial lie and 
the concealment lie. Since the dependent variable is dichotomous and repre-
sents whether an individual lied about the offer reason or not, logistic regres-
sion was used to analyze the data. The results of the analyses are reported in 
Tables 3 and 4. Table 3 reports on the analyses for negotiations with out-
group partners. Table 4 reports on the analyses for negotiations with the in-
group partners.
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the magnitude of the initial lie will influence the 
likelihood of a concealment lie for both in-group and out-group negotiations. 
Supporting the second hypothesis, the regression analyses (Model 1 in Table 
3 and 4) revealed that the initial lie parameter was a significant predictor of 
the likelihood of a concealment lie for both negotiations with the out-group 
and the in-group (out-group: b = 1.28, Wald chi-square = 11.966, p = .001; 
in-group: b = .868, Wald chi-square = 7.904, p = .005). The overall model 
likelihood ratios are significant at p < .01 and p < .001.
Table 3. Results of Logistic Regression of Magnitude of Initial Lie on Likelihood of 
Concealment Lie in Transactions With Out-group Negotiation Partners.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variables B SE B SE B SE
Initial lie 1.28*** 0.37 1.13** 0.41 1.49 1.08
Perception of fairness –0.35 0.21 –0.18 0.49
Initial Lie × Perception of Fairness — — — — –0.07 0.19
Constant –3.02 0.89 –1.50 1.29 –2.35 2.61
Chi-square 22.04*** — 24.96*** — 25.11*** —
-2 log-likelihood 32.71 — 29.79 — 29.64 —
df 1 — 2 — 3 —
Note: N = 42. Model 1 tests the effect of the magnitude of the initial lie on the likelihood of 
a concealment lie. Model 2 tests the direct effect, and Model 3 tests the moderating effect of 
the perception of fairness on the likelihood of a concealment lie. For negotiations with out-
group members the perception of fairness was not expected to be a significant predictor of 
the likelihood of a concealment lie.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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Last, Hypothesis 3 predicts that the perception of fairness of the negotia-
tion moderates the relationship between the initial lie and the likelihood of a 
concealment lie for negotiations with the in-group. In support of the hypoth-
esis, the regression analysis (Table 4, Model 3) revealed that the interaction 
between the two variables—magnitude of initial lie and perception of fairness—
is significant (b = .527, Wald chi-square = 5.343, p = .021). The expanded 
model likelihood ratio is significant at p < .001, with a strong association 
between the dependent and independent variables (Nagelkerke R2 = .683). In 
contrast, the equivalent model was not significant for transactions with out-
group members (Table 3, Model 3) with a nonsignificant likelihood ratio for 
the expanded model. Even the intermediate Model 2, which contains the 
perception of fairness parameter without the interaction term, was not 
significant.
Discussion
Past literature asserts that lying is an expected behavior in negotiations. This 
premise, however, has not been examined in situations that involve role con-
flict stemming from membership ties. Such conflict arises when traditional 
expectations associated with the bargaining role of a negotiator conflict with 
the expectations associated with fair treatment of those in one’s in-group. 
Organizations present many opportunities for such conflict as individuals 
often negotiate with those belonging to the same organizational group 
Table 4. Results of Logistic Regression of Magnitude of Initial Lie on Likelihood of 
Concealment Lie in Transactions With In-Group Negotiation Partners.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variables B SE B SE B SE
Initial lie 0.87** 0.31 0.66* 0.31 –1.03 0.59
Perception of fairness — — –0.46* 0.22 –1.26* 0.52
Initial Lie × Perception of Fairness — — — — 0.53* 0.23
Constant –1.72 0.52 0.87 1.26 3.56 1.69
Chi-square 10.92*** — 15.65*** — 27.83*** —
-2 log likelihood 41.05 — 36.32 — 24.14 —
df 1 — 2 — 3 —
Note: N = 42. Model 1 tests the effect of the magnitude of the initial lie on the likelihood of 
a concealment lie. Model 2 tests the direct effect, and Model 3 tests the moderating effect of 
the perception of fairness on the likelihood of a concealment lie.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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(e.g., internal stakeholder groups). Drawing on theory regarding role con-
flict, this study examined the reasoning that drives an in-group member’s 
decision to lie to another member of the in-group. First the authors estab-
lished that the group membership of the negotiation partner affects the mag-
nitude of the lie such that individuals lie less to in-group members than to 
out-group members. Once the lie is told, the question is, do these individuals 
behave differently when persuading their bargaining partner to accept their 
deceptive offers? It was predicted that once an individual tells an initial lie 
to an in-group member, his or her concealment lies will resemble those of the 
out-group negotiations. The results suggest that individuals lie less to the 
in-group than to the out-group, but once they have told the initial lie, they are 
driven to conceal their initial lies at a level that resembles the concealment 
lies told to the out-group. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 2, which 
displays the percentage of participants telling an initial lie and then a con-
cealment lie.
The motivation for this level of concealment lies is grounded in a concern 
that the in-group member was treated unfairly and a desire to conceal this 
unfair treatment from the in-group member. In the case of a negotiation with 
an in-group member, an individual experiences role conflict that is rooted in 
expectations regarding self-interested negotiating behavior and expectations 
related to group membership. The authors suggest that concealment lies with 
in-group members allow the individual to appear to maintain both roles, a 
self-interested negotiator and a fair group member.
The study is not without shortcomings. The use of undergraduate students 
in studies related to ethical decision making can be problematic because, 
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Figure 2. Percentage of negotiators telling initial lie and concealment lie.
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according to Treviño (1996), young people might not have reached the appro-
priate moral development stage. A naturally occurring group like a sports 
team is only a partial corrective for this problem. Also, the study design only 
incorporated proposers, which increases the likelihood of misrepresentation 
because proposers possess a more powerful bargaining position, particularly 
when the responder is unaware of how much money is to be distributed 
(Boles et al., 2000). Last, the sample for this study is relatively small. Given 
the small sample, the findings of this study must be regarded as exploratory 
or indicative.
Although the study involves a small sample of students, testing theory 
with participants from a naturally occurring group provides advantages over 
traditional undergraduate samples (as discussed in the section on study 
design). By using members of an existing group, the study entails conditions 
that resemble interactions of individuals who must engage in negotiations 
with their in-group. Furthermore, this sample was amenable to participation 
in a quasi-experimental study design that requires participants to engage in 
specific, comparable behaviors that could be tracked without relying on self-
reported behavior. Thus, although the laboratory setting presents certain limi-
tations, a controlled setting that allows real groups to engage in lying behavior 
offers a useful test of theory. Future research should examine these relation-
ships with a larger sample of employees in a workplace.
The current controversy about the moral acceptability of lying in negotia-
tions focuses mainly on the characteristics of the negotiation situation that 
might provide justifications for lying. Alhoff (2003) in particular argues that 
lying is morally acceptable because in business negotiations the involved 
parties assume specific roles and endorse certain behaviors that would other-
wise be unacceptable. Several writers criticize these arguments and point out 
that not all people automatically endorse lying in all types of negotiations and 
that unless both parties have reason to believe that lying will occur it is 
impermissible (Carson, 2005; Koehn, 1997; Varelius, 2006). Neither side of 
the controversy presents empirical evidence for its claims about when and 
why people accept or reject lying. However, all writers do concede that lying 
in negotiations is frequent regardless of whether or not it is considered ethical 
by the negotiators.
Without attempting to formulate prescriptive claims from empirical obser-
vations, the authors want to contribute to the normative discussion by provid-
ing support for both sides of the debate, which might reduce the areas of 
controversy. First, the results of the present study confirm the view that not 
all negotiators automatically lie in negotiations when given the chance to do 
so (supporting Carson’s, Koehn’s, and Varelius’ view). Second, the findings 
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indicate that role-differentiated morality might be a suitable framework for 
analysis given that the moral boundaries of role behavior and role conflicts 
are included in the model (thus supporting Alhoff’s position while at the 
same time acknowledging Carson’s criticism of Alhoff). In particular, indi-
viduals do not usually assume one role at a given moment, but rather hold 
several roles at the same time. If the demands of the different roles come into 
conflict, some behaviors that are usually acceptable in connection with one 
role might become less acceptable, thus creating moral boundaries for role 
behavior.
Although Carson does not explicitly refer to role conflicts in his analysis of 
lying, his statements point in that direction. He asserts, “It is usually impermis-
sible to misstate one’s negotiation position if one does not have reason to think 
that the other party is misstating her position” (Carson, 2005, pp. 399-400). In 
situations of role conflict, the individual knows that different types of behavior 
might be expected from him or her at the same time, for example, skilled nego-
tiator and caring group member. This conflict might make it less clear what 
type of behavior the other party actually expects, which in turn reduces the 
likelihood that both parties expect the same behavior (in Carson’s example, the 
misstating of one’s position). This misalignment creates moral boundaries to 
behavior that might be acceptable in situations of role congruence.
This study creates such a role conflict by having participants assume the role 
of negotiators as well as the role of in-group members. By asking participants 
to offer a share of money they were given to a member of their own team, par-
ticipants had an incentive to keep as much of the money for themselves but had 
to operate under the expectations of how a good member of the team was 
expected to behave. Given the communal sharing relationship among members 
of a sports team, the expected and fair behavior would have been to distribute 
funds equally. In those instances where participants tried to conform to those 
expectations by claiming they shared the money equally even though they did 
not actually do so, they viewed this act as unfair. The perception of unfairness 
originates presumably from the awareness that only an equal split would be 
truly fair but the offer made did not constitute a fair split.
If one is willing to accept that a sense of fairness is a judgment of what is 
ethically appropriate, this self-assessment indicates that individuals recog-
nized the moral boundary for their lying behavior. Interestingly, this recogni-
tion of moral transgression made a subsequent concealment lie more likely in 
order to create the appearance that the role expectation was fulfilled even 
though it was actually violated.
The behavior patterns that became visible in the present study are aligned 
with the larger management literature on the role of fairness in interactions 
between participants in the marketplace. Bosse, Phillips, and Harrison (2009) 
456  Business & Society 53(3)
offer a detailed review of the role of distributional, procedural, and interac-
tional fairness on firm success. They point to literature showing that indi-
viduals try to conform to powerful norms of fairness even when pursuing 
their self-interest. Possible reasons for this bounded behavior include the 
threat of retaliation from interaction partners if they feel treated unfairly, both 
with regard to the outcomes of an interaction (e.g., distribution of bonuses) 
and with regard to the process of distribution and quality of treatment.
The present study confirms that giving one’s interaction partner the feel-
ing like they are both receiving a fair share and being treated fairly is an 
important motivator for behavior. However, the results also indicate that the 
powerful motivation to conform to fairness norms can also motivate negative 
behavior—lying, particularly in situations in which expectations of fairness 
from interaction partners are high. This suggests that fairness perceptions do 
not play the same role in affecting treatment of all stakeholders equally. If 
some stakeholders are perceived to be in-group members (e.g., employees, 
shareholders, unions) and others are clearly out-group members (e.g., envi-
ronmental groups, regulatory groups), differences may occur in treatment 
among stakeholders during negotiations. The findings suggest stakeholders 
who are perceived as out-group members may suffer more misrepresenta-
tions in negotiations. Furthermore, negotiating with those in the in-group 
may present certain challenges that could result in the concealment of infor-
mation as a means to appearing fair and appeasing role conflict, particularly 
when the conflict in role expectations of the actor is salient and pronounced.
Even Williamson’s (1985) argument that some individuals will use decep-
tion and manipulation to help them in maximizing their utility may not be at 
odds with the extensive literature showing the important role fairness plays in 
creating boundaries for self-interested behavior. Rather, the present study 
indicates that further work could benefit from considering both literatures 
together: Individuals are concerned with fairness and know quite well what is 
considered fair in a situation, but they also might be more likely to try to cre-
ate the appearance of fairness rather than acting fairly in some situations. 
Deception, once discovered, creates significant damage to the relationship 
between parties. Therefore, it becomes important to better understand the 
conditions under which deception might occur in order to alleviate the pres-
sures and reduce the opportunities to engage in such behavior.
Conclusion
This study reveals important findings in the use of misrepresentations when 
negotiating with parties of various groups. Those who are considered part of 
the in-group experience less misrepresentation in negotiations than members 
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of the out-group. When misrepresentations occur, concealment lies are told 
to cover up the initial misrepresentation. However, concealment lies told to 
in-group members appear to stem from a sense of unfair treatment caused by 
the initial lie. These results suggest negotiations with in-group members cre-
ate a role conflict for individuals who want to be a self-interested negotiator 
and a fair group member. The study findings have important implications for 
negotiations with various stakeholder groups, especially those who are per-
ceived to be members of the in-group.
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Notes
1. Although many such negotiation simulations were conducted in the classroom, in 
which participants may share memberships with their classmates, in simulation 
research the relationship is generally assumed to be adversarial. The experimental 
design of this study moves from the classroom to the more natural setting of a 
university sports team.
2. Although the terms bargaining and negotiating are used interchangeably for the 
purpose of this study, there are important differences between naturally occur-
ring negotiations, for example, in the business world, and the one-time exchange 
in an experimental ultimatum bargaining setting. Negotiation is usually a com-
plex social process, whereas ultimatum bargaining exercises do not offer personal 
interaction. An ultimatum game allows for the controlled testing of hypotheses but 
at the expense of generalizability to more complex negotiation settings.
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